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TEN COMMANDMENTS, NINE JUDGES, AND FIVE VERSIONS




When the annual Spring Symposium of the Bill of Rights Institute at the Marshall-
Wythe School of Law took up the two Ten Commandments cases then on the docket
of the Supreme Court, I ventured a forecast of the outcomes and even of the manner
in which the Court would divide. My forecast was that the "Ten Commandments"'
displays installed with a hastily arranged cluster of accompanying framed documents
on the interior courthouse walls in two Kentucky counties by recent orders of county
executives would be disallowed, even as the federal district court itself had previously
held.2 I also suggested that the outcome in this case would turn on a divided vote in
the Supreme Court, 5-4, with Justice O'Connor - in effect - deciding the case by
her single vote.
My forecast in respect to the case from Texas was that the State's maintenance
of an imposing Ten Commandments granite monument on the Capitol grounds in
Austin would not be regarded in the same way.3 A gift from a private organization
widely promoting such monuments in public places, the monument had been
accepted and installed on the Capitol grounds four decades earlier in 1961. It was
both larger in size and somewhat more strategically placed - alongside a sidewalk
pathway from the Capitol building to the state supreme court building - than any
of the sixteen other monuments and twenty-one historical markers. Nevertheless,
I predicted that the Court would affirm the federal district court's decision rejecting
a citizen's suit seeking its removal,4 and it would do so in still another closely
* Lee Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary.
1 The use of "Ten Commandments" within quotation marks here is just to acknowledge
that there is no such single agreed-upon set, and indeed, there are strongly felt differences
among rival sects. See, e.g., ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020,
1032-33 (8th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Accordingly, were
particular "Ten Commandments" cases tested seriously even for the minimum requirement
of "nonsectarianism," they all must fail inasmuch as there is no "nonsectarian" set. See also
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (discussing that putative requirement in
Establishment Clause cases).
2 See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 145 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Ky. 2001), af'd,
354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), aff'd, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
3 See Van Orden v. Perry, No. A-01-CA-833-H, 2002 WL 32737462 (W.D. Tex. Oct.
2, 2002), aff'd, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
4Id
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divided vote. The vote would be either 5-4 or 6-3. The one-vote variance in this
second hedged forecast' turned only on my uncertainty of how Justice O'Connor
would vote in this case from Texas, it being reasonably clear to me, on the other
hand, as to how the other eight justices most likely would divide.
As matters turned out, on June 27, 2005, both forecasts were substantially,
albeit not exactly, proved correct. Thus, in McCreary County v. American Civil
Liberties Union of Kentucky,6 pursuant to an opinion for the Court by Justice
Souter,7 the studied efforts of local Kentucky officials to promote the status and
sectarian commands of a jealous Judeo-Christian god8 in composing the indoc-
trinative decor of the county's courthouses were brought up short.9 Oppositely,
' "Hedged," that is, just as to whether it would be 5-4 or 6-3.
6 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
' Id. Justice Souter was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and O'Connor,
with Justice O'Connor concurring separately but expressly joining in the Court's opinion.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, filed a dissenting
opinion, and Justice Kennedy joined the dissent in part.
8 The posted versions of the Ten Commandments each begin with these particular
demands: "Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any
graven images. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. Remember the
sabbath day, to keep it holy." Id. at 2728.
9 Id. at 2737-40. There are several noteworthy features of Justice Souter's opinion for
the Court in McCreary. First, it affirms the continuing relevance of the standards provided
by Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), for the general run of Establishment
Clause cases. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2732-35. Thus, Justice Souter begins his review of
the case with the observation that "Lemon v. Kurtzman summarized the three familiar
considerations for evaluating Establishment Clause claims .... " Id, at 2732. And, still again,
directly invoking Lemon and its criteria as the point of departure for resolving this case,
Justice Souter declares, "Lemon said that government action must have a... secular purpose
." Id. at 2735.
Second, and perhaps even more noteworthy, the opinion for the Court re-establishes
with renewed significance the first part of the "three familiar considerations" set out in
Lemon, namely, that to be sustained the government action must have a secular purpose as
distinct from a religious purpose. Id. at 2735. Specifically, following McCreary, it may no
longer be sufficient that some sort of secular purpose is enough for the government's action
to survive the first part of the Lemon test; rather, if it is at best "merely secondary to a
religious objective," it is insufficient. Id. Stated differently, if the evidence demonstrates that
the predominant purpose was to ally the government with religious interests as distinct from
advancing neutral secular purposes, the action must be held to violate the [no] Establishment
Clause and fail the requirements of this first branch of the Lemon test. Id.
This latter point should provide good reason for some lower courts to reconsider what
they currently do. For example, just a month before the Court's release of its decision in
McCreary, a panel of the Fourth Circuit rejected a suit brought against a North Carolina
board of county commissioners for authorizing the inscription of"In God We Trust" in foot-
and-a-half sized letters on the facade of the county government center (i.e., where everyone
with public business enters). Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 407 F.3d 266, 267-68 (4th Cir.
2005). Plaintiffs' allegation that the "dominant" purpose of the commission's action was
religious (i.e., that the principal objective was to identify the county government center as
aligned with "God") was deemed inadequate. Id. at 270. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
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however, in Van Orden v. Perry, announced on the same day, in a very different
opinion' o issued by Chief Justice Rehnquist," the Austin Capitol grounds monolith
district court's dismissal of the suit for failure to state a claim insofar as the Complaint did
not allege that the only purpose, rather than simply the dominant purpose, of the monotheistic
credo was to align the State itself with a particular religious belief (e.g., "We believe in [a]
God.... Do you?"). Id. "[W]e will deem the first prong of the Lemon test to be contravened
'only if [the action] is "entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion .... Id. (quoting
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (emphasis added)). In the (after)light of McCreary,
this is plain error, but it is also error of a sort shared by a substantial number of other courts.
10 "Very different" because the controlling opinion by Justice Souter in McCreary
specifically invokes the criteria for adjudicating Establishment Clause claims familiarly
expressed in the so-called "Lemon" test and, indeed, even infuses a new rigor into the first
part of that test. Id. at 2732-35. In Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, joined by
three others, goes out of its way to declare expressly that the Court did not decide the Texas
case through any use whatsoever of the Lemon test (rather than that, in this instance,
application of the Lemon test produces a different result based on these facts). See Van
Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2860-61 ("Many of our recent cases simply have not applied the Lemon
test .... Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful [here].").
To be sure, the late Chief Justice's antagonism to and rejection of the Lemon test is not
new. Twenty years earlier, in an elaborate dissent, he explained why, in his view, neither
Lemon nor the foundation case of the Court's modem Establishment Clause cases - Everson
v. Board ofEducation, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) - reflected even an approximately correct under-
standing of what were, in his view, the quite modest objectives of the Establishment Clause.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-113 (1985). Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that "[ilt
is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of
constitutional history... ." Id. at 92. And the Chief Justice specifically rejected the Court's
reformulations in Lemon: "[T]he purpose and effect prongs [of Lemon] have the same
historical deficiencies as [Everson] itself; they are in no way based on either the language or
intent of the drafters." Id. at 108. That antagonism is more than well-shared by Justice Scalia,
who memorably recorded his distaste in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District: "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school
attorneys ..... 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993).
All of this being so, it therefore is not surprising that, in announcing the judgment for
the Court in Van Orden, the Chief Justice would go out of his way to make clear that the
decision of the Court respecting the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas state
capitol grounds, and sustaining the display, would not reflect an application of Lemon or of
its requirements. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861. Yet, it is on the very same day that the
express basis for the decision of the Court in McCreary was the failure of the State to meet
the requirements of the Lemon test, exactly as elaborated by Justice Souter. McCreary, 125
S. Ct. at 2732-35. So, evidently, in two otherwise quite indistinguishable cases, the Lemon
test was both useful (McCreary) and not useful (Van Orden). A more vivid example of the
severe doctrinal schism splintering the Court into factions, and even shards, would be
difficult to imagine.
" Chief Justice Rehnquist wasjoined by Justices Scalia and Thomas and substantially by
Justice Kennedy as well with a dubitante separate concurring opinion by Justice Breyer, as
discussed infra.
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was left to stand intact (even as it doubtless does today) so to declare in letters etched
large into its granite face its bold assertion of intimidating authority ("IAMthe LORD
thy GOD"), swiftly followed by laying down as its first demand (i.e., "command-
ment") that "Thou shalt have no other gods before me!" And having presumed to
settle both of those questions, the inscribed monolith proceeds canonically down
through its remaining peremptory list of God-decreed "dos"'2 and God-decreed
"don 'ts.' 13
As I say, however, neither of the outcomes respectively in McCreary and in
Van Orden came as any surprise. Nor, to be sure, was there anything particularly
impressive in respect to my facile confidence in presuming to predict not merely
the outcome in each case, but even how the Court would divide. Indeed, it is merely
fair to say that the most casual student of the doctrinal schisms 4 that have gradually
2 See, e.g., Van Orden, 125 S, Ct. at 2874 (including do keep the "sabbath day.., holy"
and do "Honor thy father and thy mother").
13 See, e.g., id. (including don 't"covet thyneighbor's wife, nor his manservant" and don't
"commit adultery").
'4 A clear marker case illustrating one such major doctrinal schism is provided by Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Dividing 5-4 - Chief Justice Burger writing for himself
and three others, Justice O'Connor concurring in a distinctive opinion of her own, Justice
Brennan writing the principal dissent for himself and Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, and still a separate dissent by Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens - the
Court in Lynch, speaking through the bare majority opinion, first provided a long list of
examples of state and national religiously-linked practices, and then proceeded to utilize that
recitation in formulating a new test (the "no more than" test) in deciding the case at hand. Id.
at 685.
The Lynch case concerned a Christmas display centrally featuring a life-size Christian
nativity scene (a "crche") purchased by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, with taxpayer
funds and annually installed under city authority by the city's own employees in a prominent
place - a park located in the heart of the downtown shopping district. Id. at 671-72, 685.
Reversing the court of appeals (which had affirmed a district court judgment in favor of citizen-
taxpayer plaintiffs), Chief Justice Burger invoked a new test, namely, the "no more than" test.
So, the Chief Justice declared in explaining and applying this new test, even if - as he
conceded to be true - the use of public money, public employees, and public park city sponsor-
ship (jointly with a local retail merchant association) to construct and maintain the birth scene
of Christ, at Christmastime, officially and conspicuously identified the city with a particular
religion and particular religious faith, it did so "no more than" was substantially true of many
other sorts of local, state, or national government practices that were, by this time, altogether
commonplace, such as the payment of a Protestant minister to recite prayers in opening state
legislative sessions, a practice the Court had upheld only a year before. Id. at 685. That being
so, he declared for the Court, the city-owned creche display was entitled to be treated likewise
and deemed to be beyond successful taxpayer or citizen complaint. Id. at 686.
To put this bizarre "test" another way, perhaps it (the city's sponsorship of its creche)
did violate the Establishment Clause, but still "no more than" was obvious in other practices
the Court was evidently unwilling to permit to be successfully challenged in the courts. See
infra note 15 (discussing practices such as legislative prayers by salaried Protestant ministers
favored by the prevailing majority of state legislators voting them into that post, a practice
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shaped up within the Supreme Court itself over the past twenty years of Establishment
and Free Exercise Clause cases, beginning even before the elevation of Justice
Rehnquist to the post of Chief Justice, 5 would have wagered the outcomes and the
votes of the several justices in these cases in very much the same fashion as did I.
Rather, if there were any surprise - and there was some - it was to be found
principally in the decision by Justice O'Connor in the Texas case not to enlist on her
own last day of service on the Supreme Court with Chief Justice Rehnquist, as she
might reasonably have been expected to do. 6 The Chief Justice held that the fixed,
the Court had upheld just the year before in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
Accordingly, following Lynch, to the extent that other state or local government entities also
may want symbolically to align themselves with religion (or even, as in Lynch, with one
particular religion), they plausibly might concede that, indeed, they have chosen to do exactly
that. They may then defend the practice, however, by observing that, in doing so, "no more
than" evidently did not trouble the Court in Lynch; and so much being true, they, too, should
be relieved of, and insulated from, any merely vexatious Establishment Clause citizen or
taxpayer complaints. See also William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr.
Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770 (1984)
(providing a fuller critical review of Lynch v. Donnelly).
" See, e.g., Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-93 (sustaining a state legislature's practice of using
taxpayer funds to pay its own designated chaplain - a named Presbyterian minister - to
open every session with a Judeo-Christian prayer, reversing the court of appeals, declining
to apply its own previously stated three-part Lemon test, and creating a "history" exception
that the Establishment Clause will not be applied to instances of government religious
practice enjoying a lengthy de facto history). Currently, even where there has been no such
"history," a county board of supervisors, beginning only in 1984 and simply emboldened by
the Court's decision in Marsh to imitate the practice upheld in that case, evidently may
institute a practice of opening every public meeting with a prayer suitably composed by
various, rotating mainstream clergy, but excluding non-mainstream clergy who are deemed
ineligible. See Simpson v. Chesterfield Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 280-88 (4th Cir.
2005) (rejecting a suit brought by offended residents, taxpayers, and excluded clergy and
basing that rejection on the Marsh ("history") exception such as it is seen to be).
6 Even Justice Breyer (whose opinion and conclusions are discussed infra in the text
accompanying notes 18-26) found a sufficient basis to join Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Moreover, in several of the more recent- and indeed, most significant- 5-4 Establishment
Clause decisions (i.e., decisions sustaining the use of very substantial amounts of public taxes
to subsidize pervasively sectarian religious schools), Justice O'Connor already had migrated
to provide the crucial fifth vote with the somewhat predictable quartet of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639 (2002) (sustaining tax-funded vouchers redeemable from public treasury by
parochial schools established and operated under pervasively indoctrinative sectarian religious
auspices); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling two previous Supreme Court
cases and sustaining tax-funded educational services and state educational personnel integrated
in parochial school curricula and premises); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)
(upholding provision of large amounts of school equipment purchased by government agencies
with taxpayers' public funds to pervasively religious parochial schools). In this plurality
decision, which overruled two prior Supreme Court cases, Justice Thomas was joined by Chief
20051
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monumental, capitol grounds display, despite its theocratic declamations and promi-
nent location (fronting the walkway between the capitol building and the state supreme
court), was exempt from a valid First Amendment complaint. Justice O'Connor was
unable to agree. In one of her final votes on the Supreme Court in this critical area -
one of the most vexed areas of constitutional law during her very substantial tenure
on the Supreme Court - Justice O'Connor came 'round to join with Justices Souter,
Ginsberg, and Stevens to reaffirm the constitutional imperative of "religious neu-
trality" on the part of government, even as the Court had once unanimously approved
that imperative a half-century earlier, 7 before beginning its lengthy slide into what is
now its utter doctrinal disarray. The second surprise in Van Orden, perhaps more
consequential as I think it was (and is'"), came wrapped within the vote - and
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, and a separate concurring opinion was
filed by Justice O'Connor, in which Justice Breyer joined.
' The following compelling paragraph, authored by Justice Hugo Black, appears in
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). At the time, it was subscribed to
by all nine justices of the Supreme Court (namely, in addition to Justice Black, Chief Justice
Vinson and Justices Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, Rutledge, and Burton).
To be sure, there were divided votes in particular cases, including Everson itself, but the
division of votes differed on the application of these statements and not on any disagreement
with the following statements as they appeared in Everson, provided by Justice Black, and
substantially derived from a unanimous nineteenth century decision relying on Madison's and
Jefferson's views:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organi-
zation or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall
of separation between church and State."
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
Among the seven sentences of this paragraph, one may now draw a line through the
second sentence, the fifth sentence, and the seventh. They are all substantially inaccurate
representations, or false statements, as of the summer of2005. Moreover, as it happens, even
this degree of severe editing will not quite suffice, as parts of three of the four remaining
sentences in the paragraph are now quite doubtful in certain respects as well.
18 In part, this is because Justice O'Connor is now retiring from the Court, while Justice
Breyer obviously is not.
[Vol. 14:17
TEN COMMANDMENTS, NINE JUDGES
"explanation" for that vote - by Justice Breyer in providing the critical fifth vote,
sustaining the Texas Capitol ground monument display, as would not have been the
outcome without his vote. Justice Breyer distanced himself from the Rehnquist-
Thomas-Scalia overall version of the First Amendment's religion clauses.' 9 Instead,
he expressly embraced the views of Justice O'Connor as they had just been expressed
by her in the McCreary case."° Justice Breyer nevertheless also conjectured that a
"9 Under this vision, identification of civil government with the religious foundations of
"judeo-Christian" doctrines, texts, iconography, rituals, scriptures, observances, prayers, etc.,
at least when not coercively imposed on nonadherents, ought in general not be thought to be
foreclosed by the First Amendment, but, rather, merely reflective of long-standing traditions
(thus, a constitutionally acceptable practice as such). The Rehnquist-Thomas-Scalia view is
roughly - though not completely - aligned with Joseph Story's interpretative preference
of the Establishment Clause - namely, that "the real object" of the [no] Establishment
Clause was "not to countenance, much less to advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or
infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and
to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the
exclusive patronage of the national government." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 991, at 701 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak
eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833). In Story's recorded view, "Christianity is
indispensable to the true interests & solid foundations of all free governments. I distinguish
• . .between the establishment of a particular sect, as the Religion of the State, & the
Establishment of Christianity itself, without any preference of any particular form of it."
Letter from Joseph Story to Jasper Adams (May 14, 1833), in RELIGION AND POLmcs IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC 115 (Daniel L. Dreisbach ed., 1996).
Additionally, Justice Thomas maintains his own separate view, namely, that the
Establishment Clause does not apply to the states at all. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct.
2854, 2865 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). Rather, in his view, the Establishment Clause
essentially secures each state from any act of Congress that would presume to interfere with
the manner in which each state may resolve to favor - or not to favor - particular religions.
In brief, the Establishment Clause is essentially a "federalism" clause, neither more nor less.
Id. ("I have previously suggested that the [no establishment] Clause's text and history
'resis[t] incorporation' against the States." (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1, 46 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment))); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639, 677-80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
21 See, e.g., Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing that "[t]hey
[the First Amendment's Religion Clauses] seek to further the basic pinciples set forth today
by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in McCreary.") In Justice O'Connor's restate-
ment of her views in McCreary County, citing James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments, she put the controlling principle this way: "Government...
may not prefer one religion over another or promote religion over nonbelief.... And govern-
ment may not, by 'endorsing religion or a religious practice,' 'mak[e] adherence to religion
relevant to a person's standing in the political community."' McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2746
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985)) (explaining the "no endorsement" feature
of her Establishment Clause test). James Madison may have put the proposition in even more
compelling prose. He denied that "the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious
truth," and he suggested the deep impropriety of government attempts to ally itself with even
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holding requiring the removal - or even relocation - of the Austin Capitol grounds
monument "might ... encourage disputes concerning the removal of longstanding
depictions of the Ten Commandments from public buildings"'" in other locations, i.e.,
numerous "Ten Commandment" depictions already maintained in many places,
through much of the United States. The political repercussions of such additional
disputes - including repercussions for the Court itself- could be substantial.22 The
prospect of setting a precedent (as Breyer declared it could be set by this very case
unless he were to find nothing unconstitutional on the facts of the case) that would
lend new encouragement to others to seek relief from those numerous governmental
practices was too much for Justice Breyer. Indeed, he declared, so to hold against the
permissibility of the Austin Capitol grounds monolith "could thereby create the very
kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.' 23
So, then, how best to avoid that divisiveness? What would be best for the Court to
do?
What followed, for Justice Breyer, was for him to find a way to split the
difference, so to speak. In his view, as he had just spoken to it, the proliferation of
other "divisive" lawsuits such as this could best be discouraged simply byfinding no
conflict (or at least no sufficient conflict) with the Establishment Clause. Thus, by
finding no sufficient conflict in this case (and in his view possibly not otherwise), the
Court might suitably signal to others that it would be pointless for any of them to bring
other such "divisive" suits of a similar sort, and so spare the Court itself, as well as the
greater polity, more acrimony and grief.24
the Christian Religion as such, calling all such attempts "an unhallowed perversion of the
means of salvation" by the civil state and simultaneously an action that "degrades from the
equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the
Legislative authority." Everson, 330 U.S. at 63-69. The full Memorial and Remonstrance by
Madison is reprinted as an Appendix in Everson. Id. at 63-72.
21 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2871.
22 For example, a "jurisdiction-stripping statute" enacted by Congress or an amendment
to the Constitution itself might be contemplated.
23 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2871.
24 On the other hand, of course, to have sustained the propriety of setting aside prime
capitol ground premises for the frankly larger-than-life special promotional display presented
on the facts of Van Orden v. Perry, as Justice Breyer decided to do in this case (and by his
vote, caused to be the very outcome of the case), may itself merely add fuel to such efforts,
i.e., to repeat the scene elsewhere and engender still more rounds of controversy and
"divisive effects." For example, one might now expect equivalent offers to donate "Ten
Commandment" monuments for prominent placement on other government premises, here,
there, everywhere, even to be increased. And, even as these events may predictably transpire,
as they already had well before the Van Orden case, as discussed in ACLU Nebraska
Foundation v. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005)
(en banc), others may likewise press more aggressively, surely, in order that their religious
monuments, their sacred documents, texts, etc., at least be given similar treatment or demand
to be told why that just cannot be - whether in Texas or anywhere else. If others merely
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So, in the end, while Justice Breyer did not accept the reasoning of the Rehnquist
opinion, he acquiesced in the outcome. And he did so by "reasoning" (i.e., declaring)
that "the Texas display... serv[ed] a mixed but primarily nonreligious purpose, not
primarily 'advanc[ing]' or 'inhibit[ing] religion,' and not creating an 'excessive
government entanglement with religion,"' 25 and therefore also not subject to any valid
Establishment Clause citizen or taxpayer complaint. Yet, since he "reasoned" in this
fashion only after first effectively declaring why, in his opinion, to hold against the
state in this instance might be singularly ill-advised (because too "divisive" and
productive of more backlash and grief), Justice Breyer may not in fact persuade any
disinterested reader that the dissenting justices (including Justice O'Connor herself)
were wrong in concluding differently on the merits of the case itself. Instead, he may
have merely managed, albeit inadvertently, to show why he would say they were
wrong - even supposing they were not.
Some may find that Justice Breyer's opinion is merely a good example of com-
mendable candor and pragmatism at work on the Court. Perhaps quite unreasonably,
however, I am more inclined to count it as a regrettable sign of a failed judge. For
what Justice Breyer actually managed to do, I think, was to try to preserve his
standing in identifying himself with the strong views held by some of his colleagues
(Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and O'Connor) even while openly suggesting that
he was capable of a goodly degree of political truckling, i.e., to try very hard to find
a way to sustain the state action, by "finding" it met their criteria after all - though
none of them thought that it did, and neither is the reader likely to think so either.
To put the same matter only a little differently, if just for emphasis, if in fact
Justice Breyer simply and actually believed the Texas case passed muster under the
Lemon criteria (as embellished by Justice O'Connor's insights which he joined), he
should have said so and have left it at that. And if not, then not. In the actual case,
however, his public breast-baring - of "concerns" over possible new rounds of
lawsuits and adverse reaction to a decision if it went against Texas - was unseemly
at best. And, offered as furnishing an "explanation" for his vote, it strikes me as
unlikely to win either much public admiration or, indeed, any great degree of
professional respect.26
want "equal treatment" for "their" religion, whether Hindu, Moslem, Rastafarian, or Wiccan,
what is then to be the appropriate response? And how then shall the Court itself respond? In
brief, it is not at all implausible that Justice Breyer's particular brand of pragmatism -
"sustain this arrangement and hope it is enough to buy peace" - may itself be seriously
counterproductive and quite off the mark.
25 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2871 (emphases added).
26 The "message" more likely to be communicated insofar as a justice on the Supreme
Court suggests that he or she will stretch to assess the facts of a case in a manner enabling
a decision less likely to rile agitated segments of the public than a decision he or she would
in fact reach otherwise (which is just what I think Justice Breyer did, virtually openly, in Van
Orden), is not admirable. Even if it is sometimes reasonable for a judge to consider public
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HI.
With this brief review of the recent Ten Commandments cases now completed,
aided by several quite lengthy footnotes 7 that were surely more than adequate to show
the collapse of consensus and the very sharp disparity of views among the nine
justices who shared in adjudications of Establishment Clause cases brought to the
Court since these justices first assembled together in 1994,2" it is nonetheless difficult
to know how best to summarize where we now find ourselves. One way of doing so,
I suppose, is to note still one more time the solid consensus seemingly shared by all
the members of the Court more than a half-century earlier in Justice Black's
memorable summary in Everson v. Board ofEducation,29 proceed from there to quote
reaction as an element to be taken into account in deciding cases, it is nonetheless a serious
mistake to announce that that is so. Such announcement virtually instructs "the public" (and
confirms its low regard for judges) what is best to do insofar as it wants to influence the
resolve ofjudges to apply (or, rather, not apply) the law as best they understand it, even as
their colleagues remain more steadfast in their willingness so to do, as was illustrated in Van
Orden itself.
To be sure, a recent major work warmly embraces the resource of hostile popular agitation
as a wholly legitimate means of checking and influencing the decisions of the Supreme Court.
See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONsTITuTIONALIsM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). Even if it is legitimate, however, the idea does not easily translate
into a suggestion that the judges should themselves also declare in deciding cases that come
before them, insofar as a decision one way would meet with less litigative fallout and greater
public acceptance than a decision the other way, that they will receive evidence on that
question and, at least in close cases, be guided by what the preponderance of that evidence
may show in exactly that regard. And the Kramer thesis itself hardly provides a basis for
expecting any more enlightened constitutional decisions (rather than less enlightened decisions)
from the Supreme Court. For an able and sharply critical review, see Lucas A. Powell, Jr., Are
"the People" Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REv. 855 (2005).
27 See supra notes 9-10, 14-17, 19-20, 24, 26.
21 1994 marks the year of Justice Breyer's confirmation (following Justice Ginsburg's
appointment in 1993).
29 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organi-
zation or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
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usefully from William Butler Yeats's cautionary poem, "The Second Coming,"3 ° then
note the useful comparisons that suggest themselves, and pretty well just leave it at
that. And, in favor of that idea, it is certainly true that since 1947, "Things" (i.e.,
judicial consensus regarding the Establishment Clause) have "fall[en] apart." I
suppose it may likewise be true that "the centre cannot hold," ifjust because, all other
things aside, it is quite hard these days even to identify a real center as such at all,
since so frequently a single justice (or perhaps two) effectively decides most of the
cases today. And, given that much, perhaps all one can do now is to wonder, indeed,
"what [sort of] rough beast" even now may "slouch" - if not toward Bethlehem, then
nonetheless toward Washington - "to be born."'
These comparisons are tempting, but I think them not the most suitable. Rather,
I think it better not to be so dour (or so trite) to call still again on W.B. Yeats, when
there is a much more suitable metaphor - or image - I think far better describes our
nearly zany current situation with the Supreme Court. It is an image provided in the
closing scene from a recent and deservedly popular animated children' s film, Finding
Nemo.32 The final frames, alas, quite perfectly describe the current Supreme Court in
its fractured views on the separation (or fusion) of church and state.
As this genuinely fimny and quite charming full-length motion picture nears its
end, little Nemo (a small clown fish with a most mischievous grin) is reunited with his
father, Marlin, and with Dory, a loopy, loyal friend, after all manner of harrowing
misadventures they have somehow managed to overcome. From the opening scary
scenes, in which a shadowy barracuda claims Nemo's mother and all of her eggs, save
only the last from which little Nemo is hatched, to Nemo's truancy in wandering too
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall
of separation between church and State."
Id. at 16.
30 For the forgetful reader, here are a few of the lines from Yeats's famous apocalyptic
work:
Turning and turning in the widening gyre,
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world...
The best lack all conviction, while the worst,
Are full of passionate intensity....
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?
W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming, in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF W.B. YEATS 187 (Richard
J. Finneran ed., 1989).
31 The point is the obvious one, i.e., that the Court is even now undergoing a change, with
the passing of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the confirmation of Judge John Roberts as the new
Chief Justice of the United States, and the pending retirement of Justice O'Connor (the most
frequent "swing" vote) as soon as some successor is confirmed to take her seat.
32 FINDING NEMO (Disney/Pixar 2003).
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far from the safe shelter of the coral reef when he is caught by a commercial scuba
diver, carried away, and sold to a dentist to add to his office aquarium overlooking
Sydney Harbor, the story unfolds in the grand tradition of Homer's Odyssey itself.
Eventually, though, and just as one truly wants - any other ending would just be so
utterly wrong one would not forgive the producers - Nemo and Marlin (and of
course Dory too) are returned to their thriving coral reef community. It is a wonderful
story, winningly told, virtually from beginning to end.
However the movie is not yet quite over with the last scene as I just now
described it. Instead, there is one last short series of frames at the very end, when we
are taken away from Nemo's happy habitat with Marlin and Dory, suddenly to be
whisked briefly back to Sydney Harbor one last time. There, in these closing frames,
just in the water beside the pier, bobbing like so many corks nearby the building from
which they, too, made their escape from the mad dentist's office in water-filled
transparent bags of the very sort one uses to carry tropical fish home from any
ordinary aquarium shop, are Nemo's former fellow captives from the dentist's office
tank, in which they, too, were previously held. Each one of these former aquarium
mates now floats freely in his own transparent bag, after successfully having bounced
over the dentist's office window sill, down to the pier, over the side, and into the water
below. As the last of this happy band of piscatorial escapees clears the edge of the
pier, a hearty cheer goes up for the last arrival. So, even here, it seems, everything is
just wonderful as well.
But just as one expects the usual words ("The End") to begin to scroll across the
screen, for another moment nothing happens. Instead, the camera remains briefly but
closely fixed on the harbor scene - of Nemo's former friends, each safely inside his
separate transparent, water-filled bag in which each has made his escape, and each one
now bobbing, gently, in the sea beside the pier. What remains now takes less than a
minute, in the closing of this sweet, sweet last scene.
The last celebrative cheer for the whole of our tiny group's seemingly successful
escape has just died away. It is now all quiet. Only the slight sounds of the gently
lapping waters are audible on the soundtrack. Finally, however, as each of Nemo's
fmny friends looks out through the sheer transparent plastic membrane of his own
floating aquarium bag at each of the others similarly bobbing, but then also takes the
measure of the very large sea surrounding them all, the very last words of the film
are given voice. Blinking, looking somewhat bemused but perhaps also just a little
worried, happy to have come this far but afflicted with a sudden thought, one of them
suddenly declares: "Now what?" And, then, to be sure, there is no more. And, then,
also, as to the question ("Now what?"), we are not to learn the answer. We have no
idea how they will get free of their tiny prisons, although we have come to love these
little heroes and now hope - and quite believe - that somehow they will.
It is this image, not something more solemn, that I mean to leave with the
reader from our now-completed brief review of last term's fractured pair of Ten
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Commandment cases just down from the Supreme Court: the last funny scene from
this movie for children, yet also a movie for all of us - of whatever age, or party, or
point of view.
In our own version of Finding Nemo, from the common consensus articulated
more than a half-century ago, in Everson v. Board of Education, there are now just
three justices (Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg) who remain reliably committed to the
strong "neutral" civil state idea of the Establishment Clause, reflected in the original
passages by Justice Black - who, at that time, spoke for the entire Court. Three other
justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Thomas and Scalia) long ago dismissed
Justice Black's Everson statement as simply wrong. They have set an entirely dif-
ferent course for the Court whenever they could pick up any two of the remaining
three less-certain votes. There was, moreover, no common bridge to connect these
sets ofjudges. And despite all manner of argumentative efforts from each side within
the Court (as well as by teams of academic commentators outside the Court), there
was also frankly little basis on which to expect them to find common ground or even
for one to declare which side was right and which wrong. Rather, each side repeatedly
marshaled mutually impressive materials to support its view.
But, of course, neither have these been the only distinctive points of view
represented on the Supreme Court, much less are they the only views that count.
There are, and have been, several others, at least three more (perhaps even as many
as four), as we have already detailed them in the course of our brief review. Thus,just
by way of very quick recapitulation, there is the separate view, consistently
maintained by Justice Thomas, that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
simply does not speak to the states at all (rather, just to the national government).33
For Justice Thomas, therefore, no state action is to be judged as prohibited by this
particular constitutional provision, regardless of what the state action may do. Quite
separately, in turn, Justice Kennedy, while generally more disposed to the generic
view common to Rehnquist, Scalia, and Justice Thomas, is nevertheless quite at odds
with them when he finds evidence that government has brought some degree of
"coercion" to bear in its various religious preferments.34 And we have already noted
" See supra note 19.
31 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992). Writing the lead opinion for the Court,
Justice Kennedy observed, "[i]t is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise," id. at 587, and concluded that where, as in this case, "coercive pressures exist and
where the student had no real alternative which would have allowed her to avoid the fact or
appearance of participation," in a school sponsored prayer (i.e., a formal prayer delivered at
school graduation exercises), taken together with other entangling facts (the school principal
directed the content of the prayer by providing "guidelines" to which the selected clergyman,
a local rabbi, would need to conform or risk not being invited back again), the line had been
crossed between what was constitutionally permissible and what was not. Id. The case is
nevertheless still just another 5-4 decision, acrimoniously dividing the Court, with a lengthy
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that Justice O'Connor occupied a separate chamber of thought in her consistent
articulation (though not altogether predictable application) of a "no religious
endorsement" test for the establishment clause.
Following Van Orden, moreover, one may need also to locate Justice Breyer in
a distinguishable jurisprudence reserved to himself, namely, that of the roving
"reasonable" judge standing more aloof from doctrine and tending more strongly to
take the measure of the possibly troubling political effects of particularly divisive
cases, to be guided accordingly, at least in marginally close cases, even as he illus-
trated in Van Orden itself. Moreover, not even this description is complete. For
among other flotsam still afloat in the harbor waters of Establishment Clause con-
troversies is former Chief Justice Burger's risible "no more than" test, fully accepted
by Justice Kennedy, as he has expressly taken care so to say.35
And now, as we view this scene, as one of the former aquarium members can be
seen gently drifting away after somehow freeing herself from her transparent pouch
as it had bobbed and jostled alongside the others, a newcomer can be seen finning
nearby, apparently of a mind to join our little band of heroes still adrift on the harbor
wavelets. Surely the scene as we have laid it out should stir no panicky thoughts,
dissent by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas,
scathingly dismissing the claim of coercion as a mere chimera of Kennedy's imagination,
nothing more.
" For example, Justice Kennedy (still very much an active member of the Court)
expressly adopted the "no more than" test in dissenting from the Court's decision in County
ofAllegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). A 5-4 majority applied the [no] Establishment
Clause to disallow a county's collaboration with a Roman Catholic group for the installation
of a full-scale Christian Nativity Scene with its banner, "Gloria in Excelsis Deo" (Glory to
God in the Highest), on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny Courthouse (its most prominent
interior public space). In his dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and White, Justice Kennedy begins by noting that there is no claim in this case "that the
government's power to coerce has been used to further the interests of Christianity or
Judaism in any way." Id. at 664. Absent that feature, he declares that the case should be
decided under the terms as laid out in Chief Justice Burger's "no more than" test in Lynch
v. Donnelly. 1d. at 665. He then declared that the Court's opinion by Burger in Lynch is
"precisely the same analysis as that I apply today." Id. at 665 n.4 (emphasis in original). He
proceeded accordingly to state that, in order to find a violation in this case consistent with
the Lynch test, the Court would have to view this county's actions "as more beneficial to and
more an endorsement of religion... than.., the legislative prayers upheld in Marsh v.
Chambers," which he declares it is not and therefore is exempt from the Establishment
Clause on that account. Id. (first emphasis added). And to leave no doubt of the matter, he
adds: "I accept and indeed approve both the holding and the reasoning of Chief Justice
Burger's Opinion in Lynch, and so I must dissent." Id. at 667 (emphasis added). Assuredly
there continues to be strong support for the "history exception" as well - i.e., that whatever
the apparent inconsistency of a government practice with the Establishment Clause, if it can
claim a suitable lineage, it will not now be found constitutionally wanting by (a majority of)
the Supreme Court.
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much less apocalyptic visions of sheer anarchy let loose, as in the famous poem by
Yeats. Not at all. Such visions as these are vastly overwrought. But it may do good
service and certainly support our mutual bemused interest in pressing this perfectly
suitable Finding Nemo question, instead, wondering a little anxiously, even as one
expects it might also be pondered among the cloaked figures, severally seated in their
dark robes, spaced out upon the Court:
"Now what?"

